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versions of the paper with great competence. Abstract:  This article aims at making a bridge between the theory of optimal 
auditing and current procedures applied to audit files in different markets where 
scoring is the instrument used to implement an audit strategy. The literature has not 
yet developed an optimal audit policy for the scoring methodology. Our application is 
meant for the audit of insurance fraud but can be applied to many other activities that 
use the scoring approach. On the theoretical side, we show that the optimal auditing 
strategy takes the form of a “Red Flags Strategy” which consists in referring claims to 
a Special Investigation Unit (SIU) when certain fraud indicators are observed. Fraud 
indicators are classified based on the degree to which they reveal an increasing 
probability of fraud and this strategy remains optimal if the investigation policy is 
budget constrained. Moreover, the auditing policy acts as a deterrence device. On 
the empirical side, four significant results are obtained with data from a large 
European insurance company. First, we are able to compute a critical suspicion index 
for fraud, providing a threshold above which all claims must be audited. Secondly, we 
obtain that if the insurer applies this policy, he will save more than €22 million, which 
represents 43% of the current cost of fraudulent claims. Thirdly, we show that it is 
possible to improve these results by using information capable of isolating different 
groups of insureds with different morale costs of fraud. Finally, our results indicate 
how the deterrence effect of the audit scheme can be taken into account and how it 
affects the optimal auditing strategy. 
 
Keywords: Optimal audit, scoring methodology, insurance fraud, red flags strategy, 
fraud indicators, suspicion index, morale cost of fraud. 
 





Auditing has been a major topic of interest in the economic and financial literature since the 
path-breaking articles published by Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985). It is 
indeed widely accepted that the prevalence of auditing arises from the informational 
asymmetries between principals (bankers, insurers, regulators, tax inspectors…) and agents 
(borrowers, insureds, regulated firms, tax payers…), asymmetries which lead to implement 
costly state-verification strategies. The trade-off between monitoring costs and mitigating 
informational asymmetries between principal and agent is in fact the core of the economic 
analysis of auditing. 
 
On the empirical side, the importance of auditing in corporations, financial institutions or 
governmental agencies has given rise to serious analysis of the design of optimal auditing 
procedures (e.g. Should auditing be internal or external? How should auditors be rewarded? 
How can collusion between auditors and those audited be avoided? How frequent should 
auditing be?…) and has motivated firms and governments to search for relevant information 
on ways to cut auditing costs. Nowadays, the search for optimal auditing procedures is a 
major concern for a number of players: banks and insurance companies seeking better risk 
assessment of their customers; prudential regulators of the banking and insurance industries; 
governments pursuing better compliance by taxpayers; and regulatory agencies in the field of 
environmental law, food safety or working conditions.  
 
On the theoretical side, many extensions of the basic models have been proposed. In 
particular, Townsend (1988) and Mookherjee and Png (1989) have shown that random 
auditing dominates deterministic models. Among many other issues, the effect of collusion 
between auditees and auditors (e.g. between a tax inspector and a tax payer or between a 
manager and an internal auditor) or between auditees and third parties (such as a health care 
provider in the case of an insurance claim) has received special attention (Kofman and 
Lawarrée, 1993). The consequences of commitment vs. no-commitment assumptions in an 
auditing procedure have also been examined with the analytical tools of modern incentives 
theory (Melumad and Mookherjee, 1989; Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde, 1986). 
 
Scoring is an alternative approach to auditing which differs from standard deterministic or 
random methodologies. Scoring helps in identifying suspicious files to be audited as a 
priority. It is now widely used by banks in credit-risk management, by corporations in hiring 
decisions, by tax authorities in tracking tax compliance or by insurers in detecting claims or 
application fraud. In a sense, scoring is a way out of the deterministic costly state-verification 
model put forward by Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985), a way out which also 
differs from the random auditing approach: Scoring says when a file should undergo in-depth 
investigation and when it should not. In fact, scoring is a way to cut investigation costs by 
specifying what information should be used.  
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For example, Moody’s Investors Service (2000) has developed the RiskCalc model for 
private firms. In this model, Moody’s uses financial variables to assess client-default risk by 
computing individual scores. This type of model can also be applied to consumer-credit 
modeling (Dionne et al., 1996) and to assess the expected profitability of an investment 
project or the residual value of a bankrupted firm. The scoring methodology associates scores 
— i.e. numerical valuations — to an unobservable default risk, expected profitability or 
residual value. However, the current methodology does not lead to the identification of the 
optimal score that takes into account the various costs and benefits associated with a loan 
(optimal interest rate, audit cost, default probability, and recovery rate). The same remark 
applies to other applications of the scoring model, indicating that the literature has not yet 
developed an optimal audit policy for the scoring methodology. 
 
The main goal of this article is to develop an integrated approach to auditing and scoring, 
where the scoring methodology can be used to implement an optimal auditing strategy. In 
doing so, we shall build a model of optimal auditing which is much more closely related to 
auditing procedures actually used by insurers, bankers or governmental regulators than to 
abstract costly state-verification models. We shall also show how the scoring methodology 
can be used in an optimal auditing strategy. Scoring will signal whether an audit should be 
performed or not: This will be called a Red Flags Strategy. In fact, we shall build a model 
where the optimal auditing strategy actually takes the form of such a Red Flags Strategy. 
Though designed to audit insurance claims, it will appear clearly that our approach can be 
used for many other activities that apply the scoring approach. 
 
Insurance fraud provides a fascinating case study for the theory of optimal auditing, and 
particularly for connecting the scoring methodology with the theory of optimal costly state 
verification. In recent years, the economic analysis of insurance fraud has developed along 
two branches. The first branch is mostly theoretical and its foundations may be found in the 
theory of optimal auditing. It aims at analyzing the strategy adopted by insurers faced with 
claims or application fraud.
1 This approach focuses mainly on questions such as: What 
should be the frequency of claim auditing and how do opportunistic policyholders react to the 
auditing strategy? What are the consequences of potential fraud on the design of insurance 
contracts, especially with regard to the indemnity schedule? What is the deterrence effect of 
an auditing policy? What is the role of good faith when insurance applicants may 
misrepresent their risk? 
 
The setting is a costly state-verification model in which insureds have private information 
about their losses and insurers can verify claims by incurring an audit cost. The focus is on 
the deterrence effect of the auditing strategy and on the consequences of insurance fraud on 
the design of insurance contracts. Important assumptions are made relative to the ability of 
                                              
1 See Picard (2000) for an overview.  
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insurers to commit to an auditing policy and to the skill of defrauders in manipulating audit 
costs, i.e. to make the verification of claims more difficult.
2 
 
The second branch of the literature on insurance fraud is more statistically based: It focuses 
mainly on the significance of fraud in insurance portfolios; on the practical issue of how 
insurance fraud can be detected; and on the scope of automated detection mechanisms in 
lowering the cost of fraudulent claims.
3 The scoring methodology is one of the key 
ingredients in this statistical approach. 
 
Two of the key questions are: How do insurers actually react to fraud indicators (the so-
called red flags) and how can automated early detection of fraud be performed by relying on 
fraud scores. As shown by Derrig (2002) and Tennyson and Salsas-Forn (2002), when there 
is suspicion of fraud, claims are usually handled with a two-stage procedure: After careful 
examinations, the claim is either paid under routine settlement or subjected to more intensive 
investigation. This investigation may take different forms: referral to a Special Investigative 
Unit (SIU); request for recorded or sworn statements from the claimant, the policyholder or a 
witness to the accident; on site investigation; etc. Furthermore, the reaction to red flags may 
vary depending on individuals. Developing automated methods (in particular the scoring 
approach) capable of using the informational content of red flags as efficiently as possible is 
currently the subject of really intense research by some insurance companies, particularly in 
the automobile insurance sector. 
 
In this paper, we shall link the theory of optimal auditing and the scoring methodology by 
building a costly verification model that predicts a red flag investigation strategy. We then 
calibrate our model by using data on automobile insurance from a large European insurance 
company and derive the optimal auditing strategy. As a final outcome, our analysis yields an 
easily automated procedure for detecting insurance fraud. Section II presents the theoretical 
model while Section III derives the optimal auditing strategy. The application of the model to 
the portfolio of an insurer begins with Section IV where the data set is introduced. Section V 
presents the regression analysis and Section VI outlines the model calibration and its results. 
Section VII concludes. 
 
 
                                              
2 Crocker and Morgan (1997) have developed a costly state falsification approach to insurance fraud which has 
conceptual similarities with the models of costly state verification with audit cost manipulation. Other references on this 
issue are Crocker and Tennyson (1999) and Picard (1996, 1999). 
3 See Derrig (2002) and Dionne (2000). See also Dionne and Gagné (2001, 2002), Derrig and Weisberg (2003), Artis et 
al. (2002) and Crocker and Tennyson (2002) for different econometric applications, and volume 69, no 3, of the Journal 
of Risk and Insurance, September 2002, for a state-of-the-art presentation of claims fraud detection methods. There is 
also a literature on the measurement of information problems in economic activity that interprets insurance fraud as an 




We consider a population of policyholders who differ from one another in the morale cost of 
filing a fraudulent claim. For the sake of notational simplicity, all individuals own the same 
initial wealth W0 and they all face the possibility of a monetary loss L with probability π with 
0 < π < 1. We simply describe the event leading to this loss as an “accident.” All individuals 
are expected utility maximizers and they display risk aversion with respect to their wealth. 
Let u be the state dependent utility of an individual drawn from this population. u depends on 
final wealth W but it also depends on the morale cost incurred in case of insurance fraud: 
 
u = u (W, ω)   in case of fraud 
 
u = u (W, 0)   otherwise 
 
where  ω is a non-negative parameter which measures the morale cost of fraud to the 




1 < > u u  and  0
'
2 < u  and that ω is distributed over  + ℜ  
among the population of policyholders. In other words, individuals who choose to defraud 
incur more or less high morale costs. Some of them are purely opportunistic (their morale 
cost is very low) whereas others have a higher sense of honesty (their morale cost is thus 
higher). Note that morale cost is private information held by the insured: it cannot be 
observed by the insurer. 
 
All the individuals in the insurer portfolio have taken out the same insurance contract. This 
contract specifies a level of coverage t in case of an accident and a premium P that should be 
paid to the insurer. Hence, if there is no fraud, we have: 
 
W = W0 – L – P + t   in case of an accident 
and 
W = W0 – P   if no accident occurs. 
 
Each individual in the population is characterized by a vector of observable exogenous 
variables θ , with θ  ∈  Θ  ⊂  ℜ
m. The morale cost of fraud may be statistically linked to some 
of these variables. Let  ( ) θ ω H  be the conditional, cumulated, probability distribution of ω 
for a type-θ  individual, with a density  ( ) θ ω h . 
 
Our model describes insurance fraud in a very crude way. A defrauder simply files a claim to 
receive the indemnity payment t although he has not suffered any accident. If a policyholder 
is detected to have defrauded, he will receive no insurance payment and must in addition pay 
a fine B to the government.
4 Let Q
f be the probability that a fraudulent claim is detected; this 
                                              
4 The indemnity B does not play any crucial role in the model (apart from affecting the equilibrium intensity of fraud) and 
B = 0 is a possible case.  
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probability is the outcome of the insurer's antifraud policy and it depends on the observable 
variables θ  as we shall see in Section III. 
 
When an individual has not suffered any loss, his utility is written as u (W0 – P, 0) if he does 
not defraud. If he files a fraudulent claim (i.e. if he claims to have suffered an accident 
although this is not true), his final wealth is: 
 
W = W0 – P + t 
if he is not detected and 
W = W0 – P – B 
 
if he his detected. Hence, an individual with morale cost ω decides to defraud if he expects 
greater utility from defrauding than staying honest, which is written as: 
 
(1 – Q
f) u(W0 – P + t, ω) + Q
fu(W0 – P – B, ω) ≥  u(W0 – P, 0) 
 
This inequality holds if ω ≤ φ (p), where function φ : [0,1] → 
+ ℜ  is implicitly defined by: 
 
(1 – Q
f) u(W0 – P + t,φ ) + Q
fu (W0 – P – B,φ ) = u(W0 – P,0) 
 
with φ (0) > 0, φ (1) = 0 and φ ′(Q
f) < 0. φ (Q
f) is the critical value of the morale cost under 
which cheating overrides honesty as a rule of behavior. The higher the probability of being 
detected, the lower the threshold and thus the lower the level of fraud. 
 
When a policyholder files a claim — be it honest or fraudulent — the insurer privately 
perceives a multidimensional signal σ. We assume: 
 
σ ∈  {} l σ σ σ ..., , , 2 1  = Σ 
with 
σi ∈   ,
k ℜ  k ≥ 1   for all i = 1,...,ℓ. 
 
Hereafter, k will be interpreted as the number of fraud indicators (or red flags) privately 
observed by insurers. Fraud indicators are claim-related signals that cannot be controlled by 
the defrauder and that should make the insurer more suspicious
5. If indicator j takes Nj 
possible values





. When all indicators are binary (i.e. 
when Nj = 2 for all j = 1,...,ℓ), then ℓ = 2
k and σ is a vector of dimension k all of whose 
                                              
5 Hence we assume that the red flags cannot be manipulated by the defrauders. Note that such signals used in auditing 
strategy are usually kept as confidential by insurers. Characterizing an optimal auditing strategy under costly signal 
manipulation would be an important extension of the present analysis. 
6 We then have σi = (σi1, σi2,..., σik) for all i = 1, ..., ℓ with σij ∈  {0, 1, ..., Nj} for all j = 1, ..., k.  
 6
components may be taken as equal to 0 or 1: component j is equal to 1 when indicator j is 




i p  and 
n
i p  be, respectively, the probability of the signal σi when the claim is fraudulent 
and when it corresponds to a true accident (non-fraudulent claim), i.e.: 
 
f
i p  = Prob (σ = F i σ ) 
n
i p  = Prob (σ =  N i σ ) 
 
with i = 1,...,ℓ, where F and N refer respectively to "fraudulent" and "non-fraudulent". Of 












i p p . 
 
The probability distribution of signals is supposed to be common knowledge to the insurer 
and to the insureds. For simplicity of notations, we assume 
n
i p  > 0 for all i = 1,...,ℓ and we 






















This ranking allows us to interpret i ∈ {1,...,ℓ} as an index of fraud suspicion. Indeed, assume 
that the proportion of fraudulent claims is equal to x, with 0 < x < 1. Then Bayes law shows 
that the probability of fraud is: 
 
 















III Auditing  strategy 
 
The insurer may channel dubious claims to a Special Investigative Unit (SIU) where they 
will be verified with scrupulous attention. Other claims are settled in a routine way. The SIU 
                                              
7 Of course if 
n
i p  = 0 and 
f
i p  > 0 then the optimal investigation strategy involves channeling the claim to SIU (see the definition and 
the role of SIU hereafter) when σ = σi. Indeed the claim is definitely fraudulent in such a case.  
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referral serves to detect fraudulent claims as well as deter fraud. We assume for simplicity 
that an SIU referral always allows the insurer to determine beyond the shadow of a doubt 
whether a claim is fraudulent or not. In other words, the SIU performs perfect audits. 
 
An SIU claim investigation costs c to the insurer with c < t. Under this assumption, it would 
be profitable to channel a claim to an SIU if the insurer were sure that the claim is fraudulent. 
Unfortunately, non-fraudulent claims may also be channeled to an SIU by mistake! An 
optimal audit scheme should minimize this possibility. 
 
The insurer’s investigation strategy is characterized by the probability of an SIU referral, this 
probability being defined as a function of individual-specific variables and claim-related 
signals. Hence, we define an investigation strategy as a function q : Θ × Σ → [0,1]. A claim 




 f(θ ) – respectively Q
n(θ ) – be the probability of an SIU referral for a fraudulent –non-
fraudulent – claim filed by a type-θ  individual. Q
f(θ ) and Q
n(θ ) result from the insurer's 
investigation strategy through: 
 
  () = θ








i q p σ θ  (2) 
 
  () = θ








i q p σ θ  (3) 
 
In particular, a type-θ  defrauder knows that his claim will be subjected to careful scrutiny by 
an SIU with probability Q
f(θ ). The insurer knows that, given his investigation strategy, the 
probability of mistakenly channeling a truthful claim to an SIU is Q
n(θ ) if the policyholder 
is of type θ . 
 
An optimal investigation strategy minimizes the total expected cost of fraud over the whole 
population of insureds. Cost of fraud includes the cost of investigation in the SIU and the 
cost of residual fraud. 
 
Let  IC denote the expected investigation cost. A type-θ  individual has an accident with 
probability π and in such a case his claim will be channeled to an SIU with probability 
Q
n(θ ). If such an individual has not had an accident, he may decide to file a fraudulent 
claim, and he will actually do so if his morale cost ω is lower than  () ( ) θ φ
f Q  which occurs 
with probability  () ( ) ( ) θ θ φ
f Q H . Hence, the expected investigation cost is: 
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  IC =cπ θ E Qⁿ(θ ) + c(1 – π)  θ E Q
 f(θ ) () ( ) ( ) θ θ φ
f Q H  (4) 
 
where  θ E  denotes the mathematical expectation operator with respect to the probability 
distribution of θ  over the whole population of insureds. 
 
Let RC be the cost of residual fraud, which corresponds to the cost of undetected fraudulent 
claims. We have: 
 
  RC = t(1 – π)  θ E () ( ) θ
f Q − 1 () ( ) ( ) θ θ φ
f Q H  (5) 
 
Let TC = IC + RC be the total cost of fraud. An optimal investigation strategy minimizes TC 
with respect to q (.) : Θ × Σ → [0,1] under the constraint 
 
 0  ≤  q (θ ,σ) ≤  1   for all (θ ,σ) in Θ × Σ (6) 
 
Such a strategy is characterized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
An optimal investigation strategy is such that 
 
  q(θ ,σi) = 0   if i < i*(θ ) 
 
  q(θ ,σi) = 1   if i ≥ i*(θ ) 
 




Using equations (2) to (6), pointwise minimization of TC with respect to q(θ ,σ) gives: 
 


































θ θ π π  
where 
 
A (Q,θ ) =  () () ( ) ( ) θ φ Q H Q t cQ − + 1  
 
Note that  ' φ  < 0 and t > c give 
'












































− < =  
 
which proves the proposition, with i*(θ ) given by: 
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−  (7) 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 1 says that an optimal investigation strategy consists in ranking the 




i p p /  is increasing from i = 
1 to i = ℓ: claims should be subjected to an SIU referral when the suspicion index i exceeds 
an individual-specific threshold i*(θ ). 
 
Note that: 







=  (8) 
and 
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Hence, as index i increases so does the conditional probability of fraud. The critical index 
i*(θ ) corresponds to a threshold of this probability above which the claim is forwarded to an 
SIU. This critical probability depends on the individual specific variables. 
 
Given Proposition 1, we may write: 
 
Q





n(θ ) = µ(i*(θ )) 
 
















j p i µ  
 
λ(i) and µ(i) respectively denote the probability of channeling a fraudulent claim and a non-
fraudulent claim to an SIU when the critical index of suspicion is i.  λ(i) and µ(i) are 
decreasing functions: In other words, the higher the index-of-suspicion threshold, the lower 
the probability of subjecting a claim (be it fraudulent or not) to special investigation by an 
SIU. 
 
Hence, i*(θ ) minimizes 
 
  () ( ) () () ( ) () () () () i t i c i H i c λ λ θ λ φ π π µ − + − + 1 1  (11) 
 
with respect to i ∈  {1,...,ℓ}. 
 
For a type-θ  individual, the expected cost attributable to fraud is the sum of: 
 
  C
n(i) ≡ cπµ(i) 
 
which is the expected investigation cost of non-fraudulent claims that are incorrectly referred 
to an SIU referral, and of 
 
() ( ) ( ) () () () () () () i t i c i H i C
f λ λ θ λ φ π θ − + − = 1 1 ,  
 
which is the expected cost of fraudulent claims. This cost includes the investigation cost of 
the claim channeled to an SIU and the cost of paying out unwarranted insurance indemnities. 
λ(i) and µ(i) are decreasing functions, which implies that C
n(i) and C
f(θ ,i) are respectively 
decreasing and increasing with respect to i. The optimal investigation strategy trades off 
excessive auditing of non-fraudulent claims against inadequate deterrence and detection of 
fraudulent claims. The optimal critical suspicion index i*(θ ) minimizes C
n(i) + C
f(θ ,i) as 
represented in Figure 1. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
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The optimal auditing policy is also illustrated in Figure 2. When i* goes from ℓ to 1, µ(i*) 
and λ(i*) are both increasing: µ(i*) is the probability of transmitting a non-fraudulent claim to 
an SIU and may thus be considered as a false alarm rate. λ(i*) is a true alarm rate since it 
corresponds to the probability of transmitting a fraudulent claim to an SIU. In the literature 
on classification techniques, the locus  ()() () () l ... , 1 * , * , * = i i i λ µ  is known as the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve; see Viaene, Derrig, Baesens and Dedene (2002). It 





i p p /  with respect to i shows that the ROC curve is concave. The optimal 
auditing procedure minimizes the expected cost of fraud with respect to (µ,λ), under the 
constraint that (µ,λ) is on the ROC curve. Figure 2 shows the dependence of the optimal 
solution on the agent's type. 
 




() ( ) ( ) ( ) θ φ π θ τ Q H Q − = 1 ,  
and 
 









Q h Q Q
Q  
 
τ (Q,θ ) is the fraud rate, i.e. the average number of fraudulent claims for a type-θ  insured, 
when the probability of being detected is equal to Q. Note in particular that τ (Q,θ 0) < 
τ (Q,θ 1) for all Q, if moving from θ 1 to θ 0, shifts the distribution of ω in the first-order 
stochastic dominance direction. η(Q,θ 1) is the elasticity of fraud (in absolute value), i.e. the 
percentage decrease in the fraud rate following a one percent increase in the probability of 
detection. 
 
Proposition 2 says that a higher fraud rate and/or a larger elasticity of fraud should entail 
more systematic auditing by an SIU. 
 
Proposition 2 
Assume that A(Q,θ ) =  ()( ) ( ) θ φ Q H Q t cQ − + 1  is convex in Q. If 
 
  () ( ) () ( ) 0 0 1 0 , , θ θ τ θ θ τ
f f Q Q ≥  (12) 
and 
  () ( ) () ( ) 0 0 1 0 , , θ θ η θ θ η





() () 0 1 * * θ θ i i ≤ . 
 
Proof 
Assume that A(Q,θ ) is convex in Q. Let  0 θ  and  1 θ  in Θ such that (12) and (13) hold. 
Assume moreover that  () 1 * θ i  >  () 0 θ * i , which gives: 
 
  Q
f() 1 θ  > Q
f() 0 θ  (14) 
 
Let i ∈ {1,...ℓ} such that: 
 
() () 1 0 * * θ θ i i i < ≤ . 
 
Proposition 1 then gives: 
 
() 1 , 0 = i q σ θ  
() 0 , 1 = i q σ θ . 
 
Writing optimality conditions as in the proof of Proposition 1 yields: 
 
  () ( ) ( ) 0 , 1 0 0
'




i p Q A p c θ θ π π  (15) 
and 
  () ( ) ( ) 0 , 1 1 1
'




i p Q A p c θ θ π π  (16) 
 
Using (14) and the convexity of Q → A(Q,θ ) gives: 
 




1 , , θ θ θ θ
f f Q A Q A > . (17) 
 
(16) and (17) give: 
 
  () ( ) ( ) 0 , 1 1 0
'




i p Q A p c θ θ π π . (18) 
(13) and (16) then imply: 
 




1 , , θ θ θ θ
f f Q A Q A > . (19) 
We have 
 
() () ( ) () () () () () () Q t cQ Q h Q Q H t c Q A − + + − = 1 ' ,
'
1 θ φ φ θ φ θ  
 
which may be rewritten as:  
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Q A  
 
Using (12) and (13) gives 
 




1 , , θ θ θ θ
f f Q A Q A <  
 




We know that A(Q,θ ) is decreasing in Q, thereby reflecting the fact that increasing the audit 
probability allows the insurer to cut fraud costs, either directly through the detection of 
fraudulent claims, or indirectly by deterring fraud. Assuming that A(Q,θ ) is convex in Q 
means that the marginal benefit of auditing is decreasing. The logic at work in Proposition 2 
is the following: Auditing will cut fraud costs all the more efficiently if the insured belongs 
to a group with a high fraud and/or elasticity rate. Indeed, the higher the fraud rate, the 
greater the direct benefits auditing provides by detecting fraudulent claims, and the greater 
the elasticity of fraud, the greater the indirect deterrence effect. If the rate and elasticity of 
fraud are higher for θ 1 than for θ 0, then, undoubtedly, claims should not receive less 
scrutiny when they are filed by type-θ 1 than by type-θ 0 individuals. 
 
In practice (and particularly for the calibration of real data), we may assume that the activity 
of an SIU is budget-constrained: Antifraud expenditures should be less than some 
(exogenously given) upper limit K, which gives the following additional constraint: 
 
  () ( ) () () ( ) ( ) K Q H Q E c Q E c
f f n ≤ − + θ θ φ θ π θ π θ θ 1 . (20) 
 
An optimal investigation strategy then minimizes TC with respect to q(·) : Θ × Σ → [0,1] 
subject to (6) and (20). Proposition 3 shows that the qualitative characterization of the 




Propositions 1 and 2 are still valid when the investigation policy is budget constrained. 
 
Proof 
Let  α be a (non-negative) Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with (20) when TC is 
minimized with respect to q(θ ,σ) subject to (6) and (20). 
Pointwise minimization gives:  
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θ θ π α π  
where 
 




Proposition 3 can then be proved in the same way as Propositions 1 and 2. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Let  ( ) θ σ , i F P  be the probability of fraud depending on the perceived signal and on the type 
of policyholder.  ( ) θ σ , i F P  is given by (1) with x =  ( ) θ F P ;  ( ) θ F P  denotes the 
probability of fraud for type θ  individuals, and it is given by: 
 
  ()() ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) () () θ θ φ π π














When signal σi is perceived, the expected benefit of an SIU investigation is: 
 
( ) c t F P i − θ σ ,  
 
Proposition 4 shows that the optimal investigation strategy involves transmitting suspicious 




When there is no upper limit on SIU expenditures, the optimal investigation strategy is such 
that: 
 





() ( ) () () ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( )




θ θ φ θ θ φ
θ φ θ θ φ θ θ
f f
f f f
Q H t c Q H t c
Q Q h Q t cq Q A














































*  (23) 
 




() () () ()


















F P F P









  () ( ) c t F P i < θ σ θ , * . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Since ( ) θ σ , i F P  is increasing in i, Proposition 4 means that there exists i**(θ ) larger than 
i*(θ ) such that: 
 
() ( ) () ( )t F P c t F P i i θ σ θ σ θ θ , , 1 * * * * + < < . 
 
Forwarding the claim to an SIU is profitable only if the suspicion index i is larger than 
i**(θ ). Hence, it is optimal to channel the claim to an SIU when  ) *( * ) ( * θ θ i i i ≤ ≤ , 
although in such a case the expected profit drawn from investigation is negative. This result 
follows from the fact that the investigation strategy acts as a deterrent: It dissuades some 
insureds (those with the highest morale costs) from defrauding. Such a strategy involves a 
stronger investigation policy than the one that would consist in transferring a claim to an SIU 
when the direct monetary benefits expected from investigation are positive. The indirect 
deterrence effects of the investigation policy should also be taken into account, which leads 
to more frequent investigation. We are now ready to test the main propositions of the article. 
 
 
                                              












The data come from a large insurer in Europe. We draw a sample from the automobile 
insurance claims files containing information on automobile thefts and collisions. Chart 1 
presents the parameters of the original data set. The first group of files (A) comes from the 
company’s SIU. This is the population of claims referred to this unit over a given period by 
claims handlers suspecting fraud. Of the 857 files referred to the SIU, 184 contained no fraud 
and 673 were classified as cases of either established or suspected fraud. As in Belhadji et al. 
(2000), we considered all these files as fraudulent because they all contained enough 
evidence of fraud to serve in designing a model for forwarding suspicious files to the SIU. 
Out of these 673 files, 181 were classified as suspicious because there was not enough 
evidence or proof to convince the SIU that these claims should not be paid. 
 
(Chart 1 about here) 
 
The second group of files (B) was randomly selected from the population of claims that the 
insurer did not think contained any type of fraud during the same period of time. We chose to 
select only about 1,000 files in the reference group, because the cost of compiling 
information on fraud indicators is very high. In fact, to find significant indicators for fraud 
detection, our assistants had to read each file in groups (A and B) to search for the potential 
indicators identified by members of the SIU (about 50). 
 
Chart 2 describes the breakdown of files chosen for the analysis: The 184 files without any 
fraud in A were transferred to B, yielding two groups of files (A’ with fraud and B’ without 
fraud) and showing that 37% of the files contained established or suspected fraud. 
 
(Chart 2 about here) 
 
In order to obtain a final sample representing the true proportion of fraudulent claims in the 
company, we used the bootstrapping method. We applied two complementary techniques. 
The first consisted in replicating the original B’ subsample six times, yielding 6,674 
observations (6 × 1,129). Then we took a random sample (with replacement) from these 
6,674 observations in order to obtain the additional 953 observations needed to produce a 
fraud rate of 8%, which is supposed to be the fraud rate in the insurer’s portfolio. The final 
sample contained 8,400 files, 673 files (A’) containing fraud and 7,727 files (B’’) with no 
fraud. Chart 3 presents the final sample. 
 








First, an econometric analysis allowed us to identify relevant fraud indicators that are 
correlated with the frequency of fraudulent claiming, i.e. signals or individual characteristics. 
For that purpose, we used the standard Logit model for binary choice. The insured either has 
filed a fraudulent claim or has not. The fraud indicators may affect the status of the file. So 
we can write: 
 
Prob (Y = Fraud) = F(β ’X) 
and 
Prob (Y = No Fraud) = 1 – F(β ’X) 
 
where X is the vector of explanatory variables (fraud indicators or individual characteristics) 
and  β  is the vector of parameters. If we assume that F ) (⋅  is the Logistic cumulative 
distribution function, then we estimate the Logit model. There is no clear evidence that the 
Logit model is more appropriate than the Probit model for our purpose. Our choice was 




Table 1 reports the regression results. A detailed description of the variables is presented in 
Appendix A. The first column (without θ  variables) in Table 1 is limited to variables 
identifying fraud indicators (the so-called red flags). The notation  d
j q  refers to variables  j 
that were directly available in the data warehouse of the insurer. The notation  p
j q  
corresponds to variables  j that required some searching in the paper files. All these variables 
are significant in explaining (positively) the probability that a file may contain either 
suspected or established fraud at a level of at least 95%. The second column (with θ  
variables that represent the characteristics of policyholders) yields similar results but takes 
into account two additional variables affecting the probability that a file is fraudulent. In 
connection with the theoretical part of the paper, these variables are used to approximate the 
individual private cost of fraud which includes a pure morale cost component but also a 
monetary cost component. We have restricted attention to two significant variables:  p q7 and 
p q16 respectively indicate owners of vehicles whose value does not match the policyholder’s 
income and which are not covered by damage insurance. Implicitly, it is suggested either that 
such people have a lower morale cost or that they draw a larger monetary benefit from fraud, 
hence a higher probability for filing a fraudulent claim. 
 
(Table 1 about here)  
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Figure 3 presents the Gain Chart corresponding to the model without the θ  variables. On the 
horizontal axis of the figure, the files are ordered by decreasing fraud probability (i.e. 
decreasing fraud score). The vertical axis of the figure indicates the percentage of captured 
responses (% of the files with fraud) according to three different methods. The first 
corresponds to a random sampling of the files and is illustrated by the 45º degree line: n% of 
the fraudulent claims will be captured if n% of the files are randomly sampled. The upper 
line corresponds to the performance of a “perfect expert” who would capture 100% of the 
fraudulent claims without any mistake. Such an expert would need to channel 8% of the files 
to an SIU in order to capture all the fraudulent claims. The line in the middle corresponds to 
the econometric model without the θ  variables, where the fraud probabilities are estimated 
by the model. This method allows the insurer to transmit a small number of suspicious files 
to the SIU and to detect a significant number of fraudulent claims. For instance, about 55% 
of the fraudulent claims are captured by the model, if we use the 8
th percentile (i.e. 8% of 
files with the highest fraud probability) as a reference percentile. This may be considered a 
very good outcome, given that we used only thirteen variables. The score can be improved 
easily by adding variables in the θ  vector. Of course, it is not necessarily optimal to stop at 
the 8
th percentile. The decision must trade off the benefits and the costs of investigating the 
files. We now tackle the innovative part of the empirical analysis related to the calibration of 
the theoretical model. 
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
 




Let  () θ πˆ  be the probability that a claim will be filed by a type-θ  individual during a one-year 
time period when there is no auditing (which is supposed to correspond to the status quo 
situation in the insurance company) and let t be the average cost of a claim for the insurer 
(average amount paid above the deductible). Since in our model all the heterogeneity 
between insureds is related to the attitude toward fraud (i.e. to their morale costs), t does not 
depend on θ . For our purpose  () θ πˆ  = 22% and t = €1,284. The audit cost c of a claim is 
equal to €280 (including investigation costs, lawyers fees, SIU overheads, …) and we take 
the insurer’s opinion for granted that the proportion of claims with fraud z(θ ) is 8%. 
 
Since  () θ π ˆ  contains fraudulent claims, the true loss (theft and accident) probability π  is 
given by: 
() () () 2024 . 0 1 ˆ = − = θ θ π π z  
 
From the above data  ()( ) θ τ θ τ ˆ , 0 =  can be approximated by:  
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() ()() 0176 . 0 ˆ ˆ = = θ θ π θ τ z  
 
which amounts to assuming that the observed current anti-fraud policy of the company does 
not entail any deterrence effect. 
 
Estimating the elasticity of fraud with respect to the audit probability can only be a matter of 
approximation: Indeed, the elasticity  () θ η , Q  depends on the distribution of morale costs in 
the population of policyholders as well as on the relationship between the audit probability, 
the morale cost, and the decision to file a fraudulent claim. In short, the elasticity of fraud 
with respect to Q depends on  () ( ) θ φ Q H  and θ . Such information is obviously 
unobservable. This is why we will content ourselves with an approximation of  () θ τ , Q . 
 
We will assume: 
 
  () ( ) ( ) () θ γ θ τ θ τ Q Q − = 1 ˆ ,  (24) 
 
where  () θ γ  is a parameter used to define  () ( ) Q Q − − = 1 / θ γ η , the elasticity of the fraud rate 
with respect to Q. 
 
Using (24) allows us to rewrite (11) as: 
 
  () ( ) () () () () ( ) () c t i t i i c − − − + λ λ θ τ πµ
θ γ 1 ˆ  (25) 
 


















In what follows we do not use information on the types of documentation available on 
claimants: In other words, θ  corresponds to an average policyholder in the portfolio of the 
company. Of course, the analysis can be replicated for different values of θ , as we shall see 
in the last part of the article. 
 
The optimal threshold  * i  is obtained by minimizing (25) with respect to i. For that purpose, 
we must first compute the values of  () i λ  and  () i µ . From (8) and (9) we have: 
 
() ( )









= =  
() () ( )













= .  
 20
 
The conditional probability  () i F P σ /  could be computed directly from the econometric 
model. Unfortunately,  () i P σ  is much more difficult to obtain directly: Indeed the 
econometric analysis yielded 13 significant fraud indicators and, consequently, 8,192 values 
for  i σ . Since our data set is limited to 9,171 observations or files, many potential values for 
i σ  should be nil. Using the econometric analysis to estimate  f
i p  and  n
i p  would then come 
to a deadlock. An indirect procedure can help us to escape from this difficulty. The procedure 
below is known in the literature as the simple Bayes classifier method (Viaene et al., 2002) 
which is equivalent to the Bayes optimal classifier only when all predictors are independent 
in a given class. It has been shown that this simple Bayes classifier often outperforms more 
powerful classifiers (Duda et al., 2001). 
 
From the regression analysis, we know that 13 fraud indicators are significant. qj, j = 1… k, 
designates the presence ( ) 1 = j q  or absence ( ) 0 = j q  of the indicator j in a given file. So we 
can write: 
 
1 = ij σ   if   1 = j q  









j α  Prob ( ) N q j / 1 =  
 




j α α >  by definition of fraud indicators. Let us assume that the  j q  are 
independent conditional on the fact that the file is F or N. This conditional independence 
assumption allows us to write: 
 











F P p α α σ
σ σ
− Π Π = =
= =
1 /
0 / 1 /
 (26) 
 











N P p α α σ
σ σ
− Π Π = =
= =
1 /
0 / 1 /
  (27) 
 





The calibration results are summarized in Table 2. Column 1 presents the identification 
numbers of the observed σ i. They can simply be denoted by index i. One of them will also be 
the i*. Table 2 has 2
13 = 8.192 lines because the regression analysis identified 13 significant 
binary indicators. So we obtain 8.192 values for  i σ in Column 2 resulting from different 
combinations of N and Y where N indicates that an indicator is not present and Y indicates 
that an indicator is present for that line. For example, the first line in Column 2 indicates that 
no significant fraud indicator is present. Line 2 indicates that only the 8
th fraud indicator is 
present. According to Proposition 1, the optimal investigation strategy consists in ranking the 




i p p /  in an increasing manner, which is done in Table 
2. The corresponding values are in Column 3. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Column 4 yields the value of λ (i), the probability of channeling a fraudulent claim to the SIU 
when the critical index of suspicion is i. In line 1, λ (i) = µ(i) = 1 and all claims are audited, 
be they fraudulent or not. Of course, this strategy would be very costly and as we shall see, it 
will not be optimal. The optimal critical suspicion index, denoted i*, trades off the benefits 
and the costs of auditing. Another example would be to choose i* = 10 as a critical suspicion 




i p p /  higher than 0.17 will be audited. This 
would mean that 95% of the fraudulent claims would be audited and that 45% of the non-
fraudulent claims would also be audited (see λ (10) and µ(10) in column 7). This would also 
be a very costly strategy. Let us now consider in detail the different auditing costs. 
 
Column 6 presents the expected investigation cost of a non-fraudulent claim for different 
values of µ(i), the probability that a non-fraudulent claim will be channeled to the SIU. So 
for line one, we have: 
 
€280 × 0.2024 = €56.67 
 
since π  = 0.2024 is the accident probability, c = €280 is the audit cost and µ(i) = 1. For line 
10, this cost is reduced to €25.66 because µ(i) is now equal to 0.45291. Column 7 yields the 
average cost of fraudulent claims for different values of λ (i) and column 8 computes the 
expected cost of a fraudulent claim for η  = 0 and τ  = 0.018. In line 1, this expected cost is 
very low because it is reduced to €280 × τ . Moreover, here  0 = γ  which means that there is 
no incentive or deterrent effect associated with a variation in λ (i). Column 9 computes the 
expected total cost of fraud per policyholder which is the sum of columns 7 and 8. The 
optimal  () θ * i  will be obtained by minimizing this expected cost. Finally, Columns 10, 11, 
and 12 respectively give information on the audit probability, on the expected audit cost and 
on the probability of fraud for audited claims. Again, if i* = 1, all claims are audited and the  
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probability of fraud is equal to the average fraud rate in the sample because there is no 
incentive effect here ( 0 = γ ). However, if i* = 10, the auditing strategy will be more focused 
on claims with suspected fraud (λ (i) = 0.95 and µ(i) = 0.45) and the probability of fraud in 
audited claims is then equal to 0.1544. 
 
The optimal solution is at line 238 = i*(θ ). We then have λ (i*) = 0.6805, which means that 
68% of the fraudulent claims will be audited. So the optimal expected cost of a fraudulent 
claim in the total insurer portfolio (Column 8) is €10.57. We also have µ(i*) = 0.04, which 
means that only 4% of the non-fraudulent claims will be audited. The corresponding optimal 
expected cost of a non-fraudulent claim in the insurer portfolio is equal to €2.25. So the 
optimal expected total cost of fraud reaches its minimal value at €12.83. Note that the 
corresponding cost at line 1 (audit all claims) is €61.60 and that at line 8192 it is €22.56. 
 
The optimal strategy entails auditing 9.10% of the files (column 10) and the optimal audit 
cost per claim is €25.50. Finally, 
 
P(F/i > i*) =  ()
() () () *) ( 1 *) (
*) (
i z i z
i z
µ θ λ θ
λ θ
− +
 = 59.8% 
 
which means that 59.8% of audited claims prove to be fraudulent, which can also be 
illustrated in Figure 3 at the 9.10% value. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present sensibility analyses with respect to the parameters  () θ γ  and  () θ z . Up 
to now, we have indeed assumed that  () θ z  is the fraud rate in the insurer portfolio and we 
have neglected the deterrence effect of the auditing policy. In fact, as shown in the theoretical 
part of the paper,  () θ z  may differ between policyholders whose observable characteristics 
are correlated with their morale cost, a variable which is not observable. Table 4 gives four 
different values of  () θ z  computed by using the observable characteristics which have been 
highlighted in Table 1. In other words,  p q7 and  p q16 approximate different values of θ . 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
() θ z  = 5.88% corresponds to the case were  p q7  =  p q16 = 0 which yields the lowest fraud rate 
in the portfolio. The other value of interest for the sensibility analysis is that obtained when 
p q16 = 1 and  p q7  = 0. The corresponding value for  () θ z  is then 9.93%. The two other cases 
are not considered because their respective frequency is too low. 
  
 23
The results of Table 4 clearly show that fraud auditing intensifies (i* decreases and  () * i λ  
increases) as the fraud rate  () θ z  increases. In other words, the benefits of fighting fraud 
increase as  () θ z  increases. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
Deterrence effect and profitability of optimal auditing 
 
The parameter  () θ γ  measures the incentive effect of the optimal audit policy: the higher 
() θ γ , the higher the elasticity of fraud with respect to the detection probability. In Table 2, 
the value of  () θ γ  was fixed at zero, which means that the setting for the optimal audit policy 
took no account of the incentive effect of fraud deterrence. However, we have seen that the 
higher the probability Q
f of being detected, the lower the φ (Q
f) threshold and consequently 
the lower the level of fraud. When  () θ γ  is positive, auditing expects such a deterrence effect 
on fraud. Proposition 2 has characterized the relationship between, on one side, the intensity 
of this deterrence effect and the fraud rate, and, on the other side, the optimal auditing 
strategy. It states that when the function  () θ , Q A  is convex in Q, auditing is increasingly 
successful at reducing fraud costs as the fraud rate rises (higher direct benefit of auditing) or 
as the elasticity of fraud grows (higher deterrence or incentive effect). These results are 
illustrated in Table 4. We observe, for the three different values of the fraud rate  () θ z , that i* 
decreases (audit increases) when the elasticity of the fraud rate increases (in absolute value) 
with respect to  f Q . This is the deterrence effect: When the insurer chooses a tougher audit 
policy (i.e. a lower i
*), he decreases the threshold φ (Q
f) or the critical value of the morale cost 
under which cheating dominates honesty because the audit probability of fraudulent claims 
increases. 
 
Table 5 presents the monetary gains of auditing with data from the insurer. As already 
mentioned, the claims rate (over the whole portfolio) of that insurer is 22%, which represents 
about 500,000 claims for the corresponding time period. Without the optimal audit policy, 
the fraud rate is 8%. So €51 million are paid for fraudulent claims and the total claim cost is 
€642 million. Let us now consider the optimal auditing policy of Table 2. First, we know that 
9.1% of the files will be audited at a cost of €280. Secondly, we also know that 68% of the 
fraudulent claims will be audited and will not receive any insurance coverage. However, 32% 
of the fraudulent claims would not be audited. The total claim cost net of audit costs will then 
be equal to €620 M, a saving of €22 M, which represents 43% of the current cost of 
fraudulent claims. Finally, we show that auditing all claims is not efficient, as suspected. 
Indeed, auditing all claims would generate a total claim and audit cost of €731 M, the total 
claim cost is reduced to €591 M but the total audit cost is equal to €140 M. 
 
(Table 5 about here) 
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The last line introduces the deterrence effect when  () 23 . 0 = θ η  which corresponds to 
() 10 . 0 = θ γ . As shown in Proposition 4, because of this deterrence effect, under the optimal 
auditing policy, the expected benefit of an SIU investigation may be negative. More 
precisely, this expected benefit is negative when the suspicion index is in the neighborhood 
of  () θ * i , while it is positive for suspicion indexes larger than  () θ * * i  with  () () θ θ * * * i i > . 
 
This can be illustrated as follows with our data. The expected benefit of investigation is: 
 
( ) c t F P i − θ σ ,  
 
where  ( ) θ σ , i F P  is given by (1), with 
 
() () () () [] ()
() () () [] () θ γ
θ γ
θ λ θ τ π









= =  
 
For illustrative purpose, consider the case  () % 76 . 1 ˆ = θ τ . If  0 = γ , there is no deterrence 
effect which gives: 
 
( ) () % 8 = = θ θ z F P . 
 





F P i = = 218 . 0 , * θ σ θ . 
 
If  10 . 0 = γ , the elasticity of fraud with respect to the probability of being detected is 
() 23 . 0 = θ η . We then have  () 224 * = θ i  and  () ()
t
c
F P i < = 193 . 0 , * θ σ θ . 
 
In that case, the fraud rate is: 
 
( ) % 3 . 7 = θ F P  
 
which illustrates the deterrence effect of the auditing policy, since the fraud rate would be 8% 
if no audit were performed or if an audit were performed without a deterrent effect. Hence 
€51 M is replaced by €46.86 M (i.e. 7.3% × €642 M) and the total claim cost net of audit 






This article aimed at making a bridge between the theory of optimal auditing and the actual 
claims auditing procedures used by insurers. More generally, we have developed an 
integrated approach to auditing and scoring which is much more closely related to the actual 
auditing procedures used by insurers, bankers, tax inspectors or governmental regulatory 
agencies than the abstract costly state-verification modeling. A complete modeling has been 
developed for the detection of insurance fraud, but the same methodology could easily be 
adapted to other hidden information problems, particularly those connected with banking or 
with the regulation of productive or financial activities by governmental or international 
agencies. 
 
On the theoretical side, we have shown that the optimal auditing strategy takes the form of a 
“red flags strategy” which consists in referring claims to an SIU when some fraud indicators 
are observed. The classification of fraud indicators corresponds to an increasing order in the 
probability of fraud and such a strategy remains optimal if the investigation policy is budget 
constrained. Furthermore, the auditing policy acts as a deterrence device and in some cases, 
the (unconstrained) optimal investigation strategy leads to an SIU referral even if the direct 
expected gain of such a decision is negative. A strong commitment of the firm is thus 
necessary for such a policy to be fully implemented. 
 
On the empirical side, four significant results were tested with data from a large European 
insurance company. First, we were able to compute a critical suspicion index for fraud, 
providing a threshold above which all claims must be audited. Secondly we showed that if 
the insurer implements this policy, 68% of the fraud claims are audited while only 4% of the 
no-fraud claims are audited. We showed that if the insurer applies this policy, he will save 
more than €22 M (net of audit costs), while he was paying €51 M for fraudulent claims. 
These results were obtained under the conservative scenario that all policyholders share the 
same morale cost of fraud and that auditing does not involve any deterrence effect. 
 
Thirdly, we showed that it is possible to improve these results by using information on 
observable variables which are correlated with the intensity of fraudulent claiming. Such 
variables were identified by including in the regression analysis different indicators capable 
of isolating different groups of insureds with different morale costs of fraud. The sensitivity 
results show that more auditing should be applied to those with higher fraud rates or higher 
thresholds for the dominance of cheating over honesty. Our numerical results show that the 
optimal expected audit probability goes from 6.8% to 12.2% when the fraud rate goes from 
5.9% (for a low fraud type) to 9.9% (for a high fraud type) which suggests that strongly 
differentiated audit rates are actually optimal. Finally, our results show how the deterrence 
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Detailed Description of Variables in Regression Analysis 
 
p q19  Production of questionable or falsified documents (photocopies or duplicates 
of bills) 
qexp  Fraud alert by expert 
qext  Fraud alert by external organizations 
p q30  Description of circumstances surrounding the accident either lack clarity or 
seem contrived 
p q21  Variations in or additions to the policy-holders initial claims 
p q35  Too long a lag between date vehicle was purchased and date of guarantee 
d q36  Date of subscription to guarantee and/or date of its modification too close to 
date of accident  
p q7   Vehicle whose value does not match income of policy-holder 
p q20  Refusal or reluctance to provide original documents (registration of the car, 
mechanical check-list, maintenance record, sticker…) and/or comply with the 
insurer’s requests 
p q16  Victim with no damage insurance and/or one who would be wronged if found 
at fault 
p q22  Harassment from policy-holder to obtain quick settlement of a claim 
d q32  Abnormally high frequency of accidents (more than three accidents a year) 
d q12  Retroactive effect of the contract or the guarantee 
p q34  Person making the claim not the same as policy-holder 
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   Without θ   variables  With θ   variables 
Symbol Variable  Parameter  Std  Error  P  Parameter Std  Error  P 
 Intercept  2.7558  0.2120  <0.0001 3.1465 0.2443  <0.0001 
d q12  Retroactive effect of the contract  0.1706 0.0829  0.0396  0.1837 0.0839  0.0285 
d q18  Delay in filing accident claim  0.1371 0.0519  0.0083  0.1088 0.0526  0.0385 
p q19  Falsified documents or duplicated bills 1.0813  0.0509  <0.0001 1.0771 0.0591  <0.0001 
p q21  Variation in the initial claim  0.4677 0.0820  <0.0001 0.4562 0.0825  <0.0001 
p q30  Lack of clarity in the accident description 0.4878  0.0604  <0.0001 0.4911 0.0607  <0.0001 
d q32 Abnormal  high  frequency of accident  0.2343  0.0645  0.0003 0.2312  0.0647  0.0004 
d q36  Date of subscription to guarantee too close 0.4227  0.0565  <0.0001 0.3870 0.0575  <0.0001 
p q35  Too long lag between car purchase and guarantee 0.7014 0.1020  <0.0001 0.6085 0.1064  <0.0001 
p q34  Claim maker different to policyholder 0.1701  0.0665  0.0105  0.1520 0.0669  0.0230 
p q22  Harassment to obtain quick settlement  0.3257 0.1016  0.0013  0.2861 0.1030  0.0055 
p q20  Reluctance to provide original documents 0.4177  0.0963  <0.0001 0.4117 0.0971  <0.0001 
qexp  Fraud alert by expert  1.3929  0.0617 <0.0001 1.3835  0.0617 <0.0001 
qext  Fraud alert by external organizations  1.2787 0.0990  <0.0001 1.2567 0.1013  <0.0001 
p q7   Too high value of vehicle       0.1584  0.0529  0.0028 
p q16 No  damage  insurance        0.5953  0.1436 <0.0001 
Log Likelihood  -1,407.04  -1,394.04 






1 2  3  4  5  6  7 
i or i*  i σ   n
i
f
i p p /   () i λ   () i µ   () () i c µ π = 1   () ( ) c t i t − − λ  
1  NNNNNNNNNNNNN 0.06 1.00000 1.00000  56.67200  80.00000 
2  NNNNNNNYNNNNN 0.09 0.98548 0.77033  43.65614  294.57808 
3  NNNNNNNNNYNNN 0.09 0.98201 0.73297  41.53888  298.06196 
4  NNNNNNNNYNNNN 0.10 0.97777 0.68780  38.97900  302.31892 
5  NNNNNNNNNNYNN 0.11 0.96277 0.53558  30.35239  317.37892 
6  NNNNNNNYNYNNN 0.14 0.96075 0.51784  29.34703  319.40700 
7  NNNNNNNYYNNNN 0.15 0.95974 0.51049  28.93049  320.42104 
8  NNNNNNNNYYNNN 0.15 0.95615 0.48573  27.52729  324.02540 
9  NNNNNNNYNNYNN 0.17 0.95177 0.45579  25.83053  328.42292 
10  NNNNNNNNNYYNN 0.17 0.95129 0.45291  25.66732  328.90484 
…                   
…                   
238 NYNYNNNYNYYNN 3.20 0.68050  0.03976  2.25328 600.77800 
…                   
…                   




Calibration Results (continued) 
 
8 9  10  11  12 
() () ( ) ( ) () ( ) ()
0 1 ˆ 2 i c t i t λ λ θ τ − − − = () () 2 1 +   () ()( ) () () ( ) i z i z µ θ λ θ − + = 1 3 () 3 × c   () * / i i F P >
4.92800 61.60000  1.00000 280.00000  0.08000 
5.18457 48.84072  0.78754 220.51176  0.10011 
5.24589 46.78477  0.75289 210.81010  0.10435 
5.32081 44.29981  0.71100 199.07933  0.11002 
5.58587 35.93826  0.56976 159.53146  0.13518 
5.62156 34.96859  0.55327 154.91638  0.13892 
5.63941 34.56990  0.54643 153.00040  0.14051 
5.70285 33.23014  0.52336 146.54181  0.14615 
5.78024 31.61077  0.49547 138.73115  0.15368 
5.78873 31.45604  0.49278 137.97851  0.15444 
              
              
10.57369 12.82697  0.09102 25.48538  0.59812 
              
              
22.56059 22.56059  0.00017 0.04794  1.00000  
 
Table 3 
z(θ ) Values from Regression Results in Table 1 
 










z(θ ) = 51.50% 
(46 policyholders) 





z(θ ) = 9.93% 
(3506 policyholders) 















  z(θ )  η (θ )
(1)  γ (θ )  π   τ (θ )  i*  τ ˆ(θ ) (1 - λ (i*))
γ (θ ) 
×  (t - λ (i*) (t - c))
z(θ ) λ (i*) + (1 - z(θ )) 
×µ(i*) 
λ (i*) 
A  0.0800 0.00 0.00  0.2024  0.0176 238  12.83  0.0910  0.6805 
B  0.0800 0.11 0.05  0.2024  0.0176 232  12.24  0.0952  0.6916 
C  0.0800 0.23 0.10  0.2024  0.0176 224  11.68  0.0985  0.7004 
D  0.0800 0.82 0.35  0.2024  0.0176  217    9.31  0.0995  0.7030 
E  0.0588 0.00 0.00  0.2024  0.0126  304    9.74  0.0676  0.6485 
F  0.0588 0.03 0.05  0.2024  0.0126  298    9.34  0.0680  0.6500 
G  0.0588 0.19 0.10  0.2024  0.0126  293    8.96  0.0683  0.6509 
H  0.0588 0.66 0.35  0.2024  0.0126  279    7.31  0.0693  0.6543 
I  0.0993 0.00 0.00  0.2024  0.0242 183  16.62  0.1217  0.7240 
J  0.0993 0.14 0.05  0.2024  0.0242 179  15.77  0.1221  0.7248 
K  0.0993 0.26 0.10  0.2024  0.0242 179  14.98  0.1221  0.7248 
L  0.0993 0.93 0.35  0.2024  0.0242 171  11.72  0.1234  0.7274 
(1) η (θ ) = -(λ (i*) / 1-(λ (i*)) γ (θ ) in absolute value.  
 
Table 5 
Monetary Values of the Results 
for the Insurer Portfolio 
 
 
Without optimal audit the total claim cost = 
 
             9 2 %   =   €   5 9 1   M  
 
   500,000 × € 1,284 = € 642 M 
 
             8 %   =   €   5 1   M  
 
 
With optimal audit the expected total claim and audit cost (with  0 = η ) = 
 
9.10% × 500,000 × € 280 + € 591 M + 32% × €51 M = €620.06 M 
 
With audit of all files we obtain: 
 
500,000 × €280 + €591 M = €731 M 
 
When  () 23 . 0 = θ η , the optimal total claim cost become: 
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Figure 3 
Gain Chart 
 
 
 
 